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Abstract Oblivious signature-based envelope (OSBE)
schemes have demonstrated their potential applications
in the protection of users privacy and rights. In an
OSBE protocol, an encrypted message can only be de-
crypted by the receiver who holds a valid signature on
a public message; while the sender (encrypter) does not
know whether the receiver has the signature or not. Our
major contributions in this work lie in the following as-
pects. We improve the notion of OSBE so that a valid
credential holder cannot share his/her credential with
other users (i.e., all-or-nothing non-transferability). We
clarify the relationship between one-round OSBE and
identity-based encryption (IBE) and show that one-
round OSBE and semantically secure IBE against the
adaptively chosen identity attack (IND-ID-CPA) are
equivalent, if the signature in the OSBE scheme is un-
forgeable against adaptively chosen message attacks.
We propose an oblivious access control (OAC) scheme
to protect user privacy without the aid of any zero-
knowledge proof. Finally, we also highlight some other
novel applications of OSBE, such as attributed-based
encryption (ABE).
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1 Introduction
Internet services usually require users to provide their
personally identifiable information (PII) for registra-
tion. Frequent registrations using PII could make the
user traceable or even impersonated. Therefore, how to
protect users’ PII has become increasingly important.
Aiming to protect users’ privacy, some elegant solutions
have been proposed, for example, privacy-enhancement
scheme [1,2], privacy-preserving schemes [3,4], user -
centric privacy management scheme [5], identity man-
agement scheme [6], etc..
Introduced by Li, Du, and Boneh [7], oblivious sig-
nature - based envelope (OSBE) is a protocol, where a
sender sends an envelope, which encapsulates a secret,
to a receiver, so that only the receiver who has obtained
a valid signature on an agreed-upon message from the
certificate authority (CA) can open the envelope, and
then obtain the secret. Further, the sender does not
know whether the receiver has obtained the required
signature. Hence, OSBE provides oblivious property for
the receiver about the signature. OSBE is especially
efficient in handing the cyclic policy interdependency
problem in automated trust negotiation (ATN) [8]. For
example, both Alice and Bob are agents of Central In-
telligence Agency (CIA). They can only communicate
with other CIA agents. Consider the problem of cre-
ating a secure session between Alice and Bob. Due to
their special identities, none of them wants to release
their identities first. Therefore, no session can be cre-
ated. OSBE can deal with this scenario efficiently. If
Alice wants to initiate a session with Bob, she can send
2 J. Han, W. Susilo, Y. Mu and J. Yan
an envelope, which encapsulates her identity, such as
her public key certificate, to Bob. If Bob has possessed
a credential (signature on the message which can indi-
cate the membership of CIA) from CIA, he can use it to
open the envelope, and obtain Alice’s identity. Other-
wise, nothing about Alice’s identity is released to Bob.
Li, Du, and Boneh [7] proposed three OSBE schemes
based on RSA [9], BLS [10] and Rabin [11] signatures,
respectively. The first one requires a two-round com-
munication, while the rest are obtained from identity-
based encryption (IBE) [12,13] and require one-round.
They pointed out that OSBE can be used in some
schemes, such as ATN [8], two-party secure function
evaluation (SFE) and complicated policy requirements
[14]. They also left an open problem that how to de-
sign an efficient and provably secure OSBE scheme from
a DSA signature. They envisioned that OSBE can be
used to construct oblivious access control (OAC) sys-
tems. The idea of OSBE has been also used to con-
structed secret handshake [15], oblivious certificates and
oblivious credentials [16,17].
Nasserian and Tsudik [18] revisited OSBE and solved
the problem raised in [7]. They proposed several OSBE
schemes from ElGamal signature family, such as Schnorr
signature, Nyberg-Ruppel signature, DSA signature, et
al.. They also pointed out that OSBE can be used in
Blogs and peer-to-peer (P2P) networks.
Proposed by Holt, Bradshaw, Seamons and Orman
[19], hidden credentials are important primitives to pro-
tect services, access control policy and extremely sensi-
tive private information. In a hidden credential scheme,
a sender encrypts a secret and sends it to a receiver.
The receiver must possess the required credential(s) in
order to decrypt it. Hidden credentials have been used
to conceal complex policies [20], and hide attributes in
access control [4]. In these schemes, a receiver can ac-
cess the resources if and only if his attributes satisfy the
policy specified by the sender, while the sender knows
nothing about the user’s credentials. Moreover, he does
not know whether the receiver has a credential.
Coull, Green and Hohenberger[21] proposed a proto-
col for anonymous access to an oblivious database using
stateful anonymous credentials. Here, a stateful graph
was used. With each access, the user’s state was trans-
formed from one to another. For each state, the user
must possess a corresponding credential from the cre-
dential provider. If all states were used, the user could
not access the database again. Camenisch, Dubovit-
skaya and Neven [22] proposed another protocol for
anonymous access to a database, which avoided reissu-
ing credentials, and was more efficient than that of [21].
In both schemes mentioned above, two building blocks
were used, namely anonymous credential and oblivious
transfer (OT). A user must obtain the required cre-
dentials from the issuer prior to access the database,
and then prove them to the database server in zero
knowledge. The database server and the user execute
an OT protocol to deliver the services selected by the
user. As a result, the following features are captured:
(1) Only the authorized users can access the database;
(2) The database server knows nothing about the user’s
attributes; and (3) The database server does not know
which services the user can access.
Our Contribution
In this paper, we propose two OSBE schemes from the
signatures which are existentially unforgeable in the
standard model. We clarify the relationship between
one-round OSBE and IBE, namely one-round OSBE
and semantically secure IBE against the adaptively cho-
sen identity attack (IND-ID-CPA) are equivalent, if the
signature in the OSBE scheme is existentially unforge-
able against the adaptively chosen message attacks. We
improve the notion of OSBE. In our OSBE scheme,
the credentials are non-transferable. While, in previ-
ous OSBE schemes [7,18], the credentials are transfer-
able. Based on our second OSBE scheme and the OT
protocol proposed by Chu and Tzeng [23], we propose
an oblivious access control (OAC) scheme, which was
initially introduced in [7]. Our OAC scheme captures
the following properties: (1) The authorized user can
obliviously obtain services without releasing his creden-
tials and the content of the selected services to the ser-
vice provider. Furthermore, the service provider does
not know whether the user has possessed the required
credentials or not. (2) Zero-knowledge proof is not re-
quired. So, our OAC scheme is more efficient in com-
munication. (3) The credentials of the user are all-or-
nothing non-transferable. Our OAC scheme can prevent
illegal credentials sharing. (4) Our OAC scheme can re-
sist the eavesdropping attacks [7], and provide forward
security. Therefore, even if the credentials are compro-
mised, nothing about the services which the user se-
lected before can be revealed. We also point out the
potential applications of OSBE in attribute-based en-
cryption (ABE).
Paper Organization
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the
preliminaries required throughout this paper are intro-
duced. We clarify the relationship between one-round
OSBE and IBE, and propose an one-round OSBE scheme
in Section 3. Then, a two-round OSBE scheme is pro-
posed in Section 4. In Section 5, an OAC scheme is pro-
posed. The applications of OSBE in ABE is described
in Section 6. Section 7 concludes this paper.
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2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the preliminaries used
throughout this paper.
In the rest of this paper, by α
R← A, we denote that
α is chosen from A at random. Especially, by α
R← A,
we denote that α is chosen from A identically if A is
a finite set. By KG(1`) → (sk, pk), we denote a secret-
public pair generation algorithm which takes as input
a security parameter 1`, and outputs a secret-public
key pair (sk, pk). By A(x) → y, we denote that y is
computed by running the algorithm A with input x.
2.1 Formal Definition and Security Model of OSBE
The formal definition and security model of OSBE pro-
posed by Li, Du and Boneh [7] are as follows.
In an OSBE scheme, there are three entities: a sender
S, and two receivers R1 and R2. An OSBE scheme com-
prises three algorithms: Setup , Interaction and Open.
Setup. Taking as input a security parameter 1`, this al-
gorithm generates the public parameters params, a
signature algorithm (sign, verify) and a secret-public
key pair KG(1`) → (sk, pk) for the signature algo-
rithm. It outputs two messages M and P . It sends
(params, pk,M,P ) to S, (params, pk,M, σ) to R1
and (params, pk,M) to R2, respectively, where σ =
Sign(sk,M) denotes the signature on the message
M .
Interaction. For b ∈ {1, 2}, Rb is chosen to interact with
S. S encrypts the message P as C = E(params, pk,
M,P ) where partial signature parameters are used,
and sends C to Rb.
Open. If b = 1, R1 can use the signature σ to decrypt
C, and output P . While, if b = 2, nothing about P
can be released.
An OSBE must satisfy the following three proper-
ties: sound, oblivious and semantically secure against
the receiver. The security model of OSBE are defined
using the following games.
Game 1. Soundness: If a user has possessed the required
signature, he can obtain the message encrypted in the
ciphertext.
Setup. The challenger runs Setup algorithm to setup
the system. It sends (PP, pk,M, σ) to R1.
Interaction. The challenger and R1 execute Interaction
algorithm.
Open. R1 outputs the message P .
Definition 1 An OSBE scheme is sound if the prob-
ability that R1 cannot output the message P in the
above game is ε.
Game 2. Oblivious: By an interaction, the sender can-
not distinguish a receiver who has obtained a signature
from the receiver who has not obtained a signature.
Setup. The challenger runs Setup algorithm to setup
the system. It flips an unbiased coin with {1, 2}, and
gets b ∈ {1, 2}.
Interaction. The challenger acts as Rb to execute Inter-
action with the adversary A.
Guess. A outputs his guess b′ on b. We say that A
wins the game, if b = b′.
Definition 2 An OSBE scheme is oblivious if no prob-
abilistic polynomial-time adversary can win the above
game with the advantage |Pr[b′ = b]− 12 | ≥ ε.
Game 3. Semantically Secure against the Receiver: If
a receiver has not obtained the required signature, he
cannot gather anything about the message encrypted
in the ciphertext.
Setup. The challenger runs Setup algorithm to setup
the system. It sends (params, pk,M) to A, and gets
back two messages P0 and P1 with equal length. The
challenger flips an unbiased coin with {0, 1}, and
obtains b ∈ {0, 1}.
Interaction. The challenger interacts with A, and sends
C = E(params, pk,M,Pb) to A.
Guess. A outputs his guess b′ on b. We say that A wins
the game, if b = b′.
Definition 3 An OSBE scheme is semantically secure
against the receiver if no probabilistic polynomial-time
adversary can win the above game with the advantage
|Pr[b′ = b]− 12 | ≥ ε.
2.2 Formal Definition and Security Model of Oblivious
Access Control
An oblivious access control (OAC) scheme consists of
four algorithms: Setup, Commitment, Issuing Credential
and Access Service Items.
Setup. Taking as input a security parameter 1`, this
algorithm outputs the public parameters params,
and secret-public key pairs KG(1`) → (msk,mpk),
KG(1`) → (ssk, spk) and KG(1`) → (rsk, rpk) for
the credential issuer, a service provider and a re-
ceiver, respectively.
4 J. Han, W. Susilo, Y. Mu and J. Yan
Commitment. Taking as input the security parameter
1`, a service item Si and a service provider’s se-
cret key ssk, this algorithm outputs a commitment
Commit(params, Si, ssk) for i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
Issuing Credential. Taking as input the parameters params,
a service provider’s public key spk and the receiver’s
public key rpk, this algorithm outputs a credential
σ which can be used by the receiver to access the
service items managed by the service provider with
public key spk.
Access Service Items. This is an interactive algorithm
executed between a receiver and a service provider.
The receiver takes as input the parameters params,
his credential σ, his secret key rsk and an identifier
ηi, and outputs the service Sηi . The service provider
takes as input the parameters params and his secret
key ssk, and outputs nothing.
Correctness. We say that an oblivious access control
scheme is correct if a receiver has obtained a creden-
tial on a service provider from the credential issuer, he
can access the service items managed by the service
provider.
Security model
We define the security of an OAC scheme by the fol-
lowing properties. This model is similar to that in [23].
Receiver Privacy.
1. The receiver does not reveals anything
about his credential to the service provider.
2. For two choices C = {η1, η2, · · · , ηt} and C′ =
{η′1, η′2, · · · , η′t}, the transcripts received by the
service provider for S = {Sη1 , Sη2 , · · · , Sηt} and
S ′ = {Sη′1 , Sη′2 , · · · , Sη′t} are indistinguishable.
Service Provider Privacy. This property is defined by
the comparison between a real world and an ideal
world paradigms. In the real world, the receiver and
the service provider execute the protocol. Mean-
while, in the ideal world, the functionality of the
protocol is replaced by a trusted third party (TTP).
The service provider sends all his messages {S1, S2,
· · · , Sn} to the TTP. The receiver adaptively sends
his choices {η1, η2, · · · , ηt} to the TTP. If {η1, η2, · · · ,
ηt} ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , n}, the TTP sends {Sη1 , Sη2 , · · · ,
Sηt} to the receiver. An oblivious transfer with ac-
cess control can protect the security of the service
provider, if for any receiver in the real world, there
exists an probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) re-
ceiver in the ideal world such that the outputs of
these two receivers are indistinguishable
We say that an OAC scheme is secure if it can satisfy
the two properties mentioned above.
2.3 Complexity Assumptions
Let G1 and G2 be two cyclic groups with prime order
p. Let g1 and g2 be the generators of G1 and G2, re-
spectively. Let e : G1 × G2 → Gτ be a map with the
following properties:
1. Bilinearity. e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab, for all u ∈ G1, v ∈
G2 and a, b ∈ Zp.
2. Non-degeneracy. There exists u ∈ G1 and v ∈ G2
such that e(u, v) 6= 1, where 1 is the identity of Gτ .
3. Computability. There exists an efficient algorithm to
compute e(u, v) for all u ∈ G1 and v ∈ G2.
Definition 4 (Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) As-
sumption [24].) Given a group G with prime order p
and a generator g ∈ G, we say that the CDH assump-
tion holds in G if for all probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithms A
Pr[A(p, g, ga, gb)→ gab] ≤ ε
where the probability is over the random choice of a, b ∈
Zp and the random bits consumed by A.
Definition 5 (q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) Assump-
tion [25].) Let g1 and g2 be the generators of G1 and G2,
respectively. Given a (q + 2)-tuple (g1, g2, g
x
2 , g
x2
2 , · · · ,
gx
q
2 ), we say that q-SDH assumption holds in bilinear
groups (G1,G2,Gτ ) with prime order p if for all prob-
abilistic polynomial-time algorithms A
Pr[A(g1, g2, gx2 , gx
2
2 , · · · , gx
q
2 )→ (c, g
1
x+c
1 )] ≤ ε
where the probability is over the random choice of x, c ∈
Z∗p and the random bits consumed by A.
Definition 6 (Chosen-Target Computational Diffie- Hell-
man (CT-CDH) Assumption [26].) Given a group G with
prime order p and a generator g ∈ G, let x R← Z∗p,
H : {0, 1}∗ → G be a hash function, and TG(·) and
HG(·) be two oracles. TG(·) is a target oracle, which
takes as input i ∈ Zp and returns wi ∈ G. HG(·) is a
help oracle, which takes as input wi ∈ G and returns
wxi ∈ G. Let qT and qH be the numbers of times which
the two oracles are queried, respectively. We say that
the CT-CDH assumption holds in G if for all probabilis-
tic polynomial-time algorithms A
Pr[ATG(·),HG(·)(p, g, gx, H)→ {(v1, j1), · · · , (vk, jk)}] ≤ ε
where vi = w
x
ji
, for i = 1, 2, · · · , k, qH < k ≤ qT .
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3 One-round OSBE
In this section, we clarify the relationship between one-
round OSBE and IBE, and propose an one-round OSBE
scheme from BB signature [27].
3.1 One-round OSBE and IBE
By one-round OSBE, we mean that the sender can send
the ciphertext directly to the recipient without having
to interact with him.
Before clarifying the relationship between one-round
OSBE and IBE, we review the definition of IBE. Pro-
posed by Shamir [28], an IBE scheme is a public en-
cryption scheme where the public key can be arbitrary
string. The first satisfying scheme of IBE was proposed
by Boneh and Franklin [29]. An IBE scheme consists of
the following four algorithms:
Setup. Taking as input a security parameter 1`, this
algorithm returns the system parameters pramas
and a master secret key msk.
KeyGen. Taking as input the public parameters
params, an identity ID and the master key msk,
this algorithm generates a secret key KID for ID.
Enc. Taking as input the system parameters params,
an identity ID and a message m, this algorithm
returns a ciphertext CT = Enc(params, ID,m).
Dec. Taking as input the system parameters params,
the corresponding secret key KID and the cipher-
text CT , this algorithm returns the message m =
Dec(mpk,KID, C).
IBE has been researched extensively. Schemes sat-
isfying different security requirements have been pro-
posed [30,31,32,33,34]. In [30], Chow classified IBE
schemes into six types, namely reduction improvement,
multi-recipient and hierarchical IBE (HIBE), exponent-
inversion IBE, standard model (commutative-blinding),
standard model (with user anonymity) and generations
of IBE. Due to the fact that an OSBE is a semanti-
cally secure public key encryption, we only concentrate
on the IBE schemes which are also semantically secure.
There are two kinds of attacks on semantically secure
IBE schemes. The first one is restricted chosen (selec-
tive) identity attacks [31]. The second one is adaptively
chosen (full) identity attacks [32,33,34]. In the latter
attack, an adversary can query the KeyGen oracle with
adaptively selected identities, whilst this is not permit-
ted in the former. We use the following game between
a challenger and an adversary A to define the semantic
security of IBE against the adaptively chosen identity
attacks (IND-ID-CPA).
Setup. The challenger runs Setup algorithm to setup
the system. It sends params to A, and keeps msk
secrete.
Query phase 1. A can adaptively query secrete keys
for identity ID1, ID2, · · · , IDj . The challenger re-
sponds with KID1 ,KID2 , · · · ,KIDj by running Key-
Gen algorithm.
Challenge. A sends an identity ID∗ and two messages
m0 and m1 to the challenger, where the only con-
straint is that A has not queried a secret key for
ID∗. The challenger flips an unbiased coin with {0, 1},
and gets b ∈ {0, 1}. The challenger computes the
challenged ciphertext as CT ∗ = Enc(mpk, ID∗,mb)
and sends CT ∗ to A.
Query phase 2. A can adaptively query secret keys for
identities IDj+1, IDj+2, · · · , IDqID , where the only
restriction is that A can not query a secret key for
ID∗. The challenger returns as in Query phase 1.
Guess. A outputs his guess b′ on b. We say that A wins
the game, if b = b′.
Definition 7 An IBE scheme is (t, qID, ε) semantically
secure under adaptively chosen identity attack (IND-
ID-CPA), if no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary
A who adaptively makes at most qID secret key queries
can win the above game with the advantage |Pr[b′ =
b]− 12 | ≥ ε.
We use the following three theorems to clarify the
relationship between one-round OSBE and IBE.
Theorem 1 A one-round OSBE implies a (t, qID, ε)
IND-ID-CPA secure IBE if the signature in the one-
round OSBE scheme is (t, qID, ε) existentially unforge-
able against adaptively chosen message attacks.
Proof As mentioned in the beginning of this section,
one-round OSBE is a semantically secure IBE scheme,
where the master key is the signing key. The secret key
for ID is the signature on m, where m = ID. The public
key is the message and public parameters. If there exists
an adversary A can break the IND-ID-CPA secure IBE
from the one-round OSBE with advantage at least ε,
we will show that there exists an algorithm B who can
use A to forge a signature. Due to the encryption in
OSBE is semantically secure, what we need to prove is
that if the adversary A can compute a secret key for
an unqueried identity, he can forge a signature for a
message.
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Setup. The challenger runs Setup algorithm in the OSBE
scheme to setup the system. It sends (params, pk)
to A.
Query phase 1. A can adaptively query secret keys
for identities ID1, ID2, · · · , IDj . The challenger re-
sponds with KID1 ,KID2 , · · · ,KIDj , where KIDi =
Sign(sk, IDi), for i = 1, 2, · · · , j.
Challenge. A submits an identity ID∗ and two mes-
sagesm0 andm1 with equal length to the challenger.
The challenger sends C∗ = Enc(params, ID∗,mb)
to A, where b ∈ {0, 1}.
Query phase 2. A can adaptively query secret keys for
identities IDj+1, IDj+2, · · · , IDqID . The challenger
responds as in Query phase 1.
Guess. A output his guess b′ on b.
We only consider the semantic security, namely the se-
curity of the secret key. Therefore, if |Pr[b′ = b]− 12 | ≥ ε,
A can compute a secret key for ID∗ with the same advan-
tage ε. So, B aborts. B can use A to forge a signature
on a message m with the advantage at least ε, where
m = ID∗. ut
Theorem 2 An (t, qID, ε) IND-ID-CPA secure IBE im-
plies an one-round OSBE, where the signature in the
one-round OSBE scheme is (t, qID, ε) existentially un-
forgeable against adaptively chosen message attacks.
Proof Naor ( see Section 5 in [29]) pointed out that any
IBE scheme can be converted to a signature scheme,
where the signing key is the master key in the IBE
scheme. The public key is the public parameters and
identities in the IBE scheme. The signature on a mes-
sage m is the secret key for ID, where m = ID. To
verify the signature on m, we can choose m′, encrypt
it using the patrial signature on m, and try to decrypt
the ciphertext using the signature. The difference be-
tween this signature and the traditional one is that the
verification algorithm in the former is random, instead
of a deterministic algorithm. So, IBE is a one-round
OSBE. Since the IBE scheme is semantically secure, we
will only consider the security of the secret key. If there
exists an adversary A who can forge a signature for a
unqueried message (identity), we will show that there
exists an algorithm B that can use A to break the secu-
rity of the IND-ID-CPA IBE. The proof can be deduced
very similarly to the above theorem. Therefore, we omit
it. ut
Based on the above two theorems, we can conclude
the following theorem.
Theorem 3 One-round OSBE and (t, qID, ε) IND-ID-
CPA secure IBE are equivalent, if the signature in the
OSBE scheme is (t, qID, ε) existentially unforgeable against
the adaptively chosen message attack.
Boneh and Franklin [29] claimed that a secure IBE
scheme requires both a public-key encryption scheme
and a digital signature scheme.
3.2 BB Signature Scheme
BB signature scheme was proposed by Boneh and Boyen
[27]. This scheme is described as follows:
Setup. Taking as input a security parameter 1`, this
algorithm returns bilinear groups (G1,G2,Gτ ) with
prime order p. Let g and h be the generators of G1
and G2, respectively.
KeyGen. Taking as input x
R← Z∗p, this algorithm re-
turns y = hx ∈ G2. The secret ky is x and the public
key is (g, h, y).
Sign. Taking as input a message m ∈ Zp and the secret
key x, this algorithm returns a signature σ = g
1
x+m .
Verify. Taking as inputs the message-signature pair
(m,σ), this algorithm returns True if and only if
e(σ, yhm) = e(g, h). Otherwise, it returns Reject.
Theorem 4 The BB signature Scheme is (t, qS , ε) ex-
istentially unforgeable against the weakly chosen mes-
sage attacks under the q-SDH assumption [27]1.
3.3 BB-OSBE
Based on the BB signature scheme, we propose an OSBE
scheme as follows.
Setup. Taking as input a security parameter 1`, this
algorithm returns the public parameters (G1,G2,
Gτ , g, h) and a secret-public key pair KG(1`) →
(x, y) for the BB signature scheme, where g is a gen-
erator of G1, h is a generator of G2 and y = hx. Ad-
ditionally, it generates a hash function H(·) which
extracts a key for the semantically secure symmetric
encryption algorithm E(·). It chooses two messages
m ∈ Zp and P ∈ {0, 1}`, and computes a signature
σ = g
1
x+m . It sends (m,P, g, h, y) to S, (m,σ, g, h, y)
to R1 and (m, g, h, y) to R2, respectively.
1 By weakly chosen message attack, the authors mean that
the adversary must submit all his queries before obtaining
the public key.
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Interaction. S chooses t
R← Zp\{0, 1}, and computes
T1 = (yh
m)t, T2 = e(g, h)
t and C = EH(T2)(P ). S
sends the cipthertext (T1, C) to R1 and R2.
Open. Receiving (T1, C) from S, R1 computes T2 =
e(σ, T1) and H(T2), decrypts C, and obtains P .
Theorem 5 BB-OSBE is sound.
Proof
e(σ, T1) = e(g
1
x+m , (yhm)t)
= e(g
1
x+m , hx+m)t
= e(g, h)t = T2
ut
Theorem 6 BB-OSBE is oblivious.
Proof In our BB-OSBE scheme, S receives nothing from
R1 and R2, so he cannot distinguish R1 from R2. There-
fore, BB-OSBE is oblivious. ut
Theorem 7 BB-OSBE is semantically secure against
the receiver, if no probabilistic polynomial-time adver-
sary can forge a BB signature .
Proof BB-OSBE uses a semantically secure symmetric
encryption algorithm E(·), where H(·) is modeled as a
random oracle. BB-OSBE is semantically secure against
the receiver if there exists no probabilistic polynomial-
time adversaryA who can compute the secret key which
the sender uses to extract the encryption key with non-
negligible probability. Namely, BB-OSBE is semanti-
cally secure against the receiver if no probabilistic poly-
nomial -time adversary A can win the following game
against the challenger X with non-negligible probabil-
ity:
1. A m,g,h,y←−−−−−X . X sends the public parameters (m, g, h, y)
to A.
2. A P0,P1−−−−→ X . A sends two messages P0 and P1 with
equal length to X .
3. A T1,C←−−− X . X flips an unbiased coin with {0, 1}
and obtains b ∈ {0, 1}. X chooses t R← Zp\{0, 1},
and computes T1 = (yh
m)t, T2 = e(g, h)
t and C =
EH2(T2)(Pb). It sends T1 and C to A.
4. A b
′
−→ X . A outputs his guess b′ on b. A wins the
game, if b′ = b.
If there exists an adversary A who can break the
semantic security of BB-OSBE against the receiver with
advantage at least ε, we will show that there exists an
algorithm B who can use A to forge a BB signature
with the same advantage.
Given (m, g, h, y), the aim of B is to compute a sig-
nature σ∗ such that e(σ∗, yhm) = e(g, h).
1. B sends (m, g, h, y) to A.
2. A submits two messages P0 and P1 with the equal
length.
3. B flips an unbiased coin with {0, 1} and obtains b ∈
{0, 1}. B chooses t R← Zp\{0, 1}, and computes T1 =
(yhm)t, T2 = e(g, h)
t and C = EH2(T2)(Pb). It sends
T1 and C to A.
4. IfA can output his guess with the advantage |Pr[b′ =
b]− 12 | ≥ ε, he can computes a σ
∗ such that e(σ∗, T1) =
e(g, h)t with the same advantage.
5. B abort. B can usesA to forge a BB message-signature
pair (m,σ∗) with the advantage at least ε, where
e(σ∗, yhm) = e(g
1
x+m , hx+m) = e(g, h).
ut
4 Modified BBS (MBBS)-OSBE
Modified BBS (MBBS) signature scheme was proposed
by Boneh, Boyen and Shacham [35], and was modified
and proven by Au, Susilo and Mu [36]. In this section,
we review the MBBS signature scheme, and propose an
OSBE scheme from it. In our MBBS-OSBE scheme,
a user’s credentials are all-or-nothing non-transferable.
By all-or-nothing non-transferability, we mean that all
credentials of the user are shared, once he shares one of
them with others [37].
4.1 Modified BBS (MBBS) Signature
The MBBS signature is described as follows.
Setup. Taking as input a security parameter 1`, this
algorithm returns bilinear groups (G1,G2,Gτ ) with
prime order p. Let g0, g1, g2, · · · , gl+1 be the gener-
ators of G1, and h be the generator of G2.
KeyGen. Taking as input x
R← Z∗p, this algorithm re-
turns y = hx ∈ G2. The secret ky is x and the public
key is (g0, g1, g2, · · · , gl+1, h, y).
Sign. Taking as input messages (m1,m2, · · · , ml) ∈
Zlp, r
R← Zp(r 6= −x mod p) and s
R← Z∗p, this algo-
rithm returns a signature (σ, r, s) on (m1,m2, · · · ,
ml), where σ = (g0g
s
1g
m1
2 g
m2
3 · · · g
ml
l+1)
1
x+r .
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Verify. Taking as input (σ, r, s) and (m1,m2, · · · ,ml),
this algorithm returns True if and only if e(σ, yhr) =
e(g0g
s
1g
m1
2 g
m2
3 · · · g
ml
l+1, h). Otherwise, it returns Re-
ject.
Theorem 8 The MBBS signature Scheme is (t, qS , ε)
existentially unforgeable against the adaptively chosen
message attacks under the q-SDH assumption [36].
4.2 MBBS-OSBE
Based on the MBBS signature scheme, we propose an
OSBE scheme as follows.
Setup. Taking as input a security parameter 1`, this
algorithm returns the public parameters (G1,G2,
Gτ , g, g0, g1, g2, · · · , gl, h) and a secret-public key pair
KG(1`) → (x, y) for the MBBS signature scheme,
where g, g0, g1, · · · , gl are the generators of G1, h
is the generator of G2 and y = hx. Additionally, it
generates a hash function H(·) which extracts a key
for a semantically secure symmetric encryption al-
gorithm E(·), and two security parameters `1 and `2
which are linear in `.
The receiver generates his secret-public key pair
KG(1`)→ (xu, yu), where xu
R← Z∗p and yu = gxu .
This algorithm chooses messages m1,m2, · · · ,ml−1,
r, s
R← Zl+1p and P ∈ {0, 1}`, and computes the sig-
nature σ = (g0g
s
1g
m1
2 g
m2
3 · · · g
ml−1
l yu)
1
x+r . It sends
(m1,m2, · · · , ml−1, P, g, g0, g1, g2, · · · , gl, h, y) to S,
(m1,m2, · · · , ml−1, g, g0, g1, g2, · · · , gl, h, y, σ, r, s)
to R1, and (m1,m2, · · · ,ml−1, g, g0, g1, g2, · · · , gl,
h, y) to R2, respectively.
Interaction.
1. (a) R1
(r,s)−−−→ S.
(b) R2
(r′,s′)−−−−→ S. Where r′, s′ R← Zp.
2. S chooses t
R← Zp, and computes
T0 = e(g, h)
t, T1 = (yh
r)t, T ′1 = (yh
r′)t,
T2 = e(g0g
sgm12 · · · g
ml−1
l , h)
t,
T ′2 = e(g0g
s′gm2 · · · g
ml−1
l , h)
t
C = EH(T2)(P ),
and
C ′ = EH(T ′2)(P ).
(a) R1
(T0,T1,C)←−−−−−− S.
(b) R2
(T0,T
′
1,C
′)←−−−−−−− S.
Open. Receiving (T0, T1, C) from S, R1 computes T2 =
e(σ,T1)
Txu0
and H(T2), decrypts C, and obtains P .
Theorem 9 MBBS-OSBE is sound.
Proof
e(σ, T1)
T xu0
=
e((g0g
s
1g
m1
2 · · · g
ml−1
l yu)
1
x+r , (yhr)t)
e(g, h)txu
=
e(g0g
s
1g
m1
2 · · · g
ml−1
l yu, h)
t
e(yu, h)t
=
e(g0g
s
1g
m1
2 · · · g
ml−1
l , h)
te(yu, h)
t
e(yu, h)t
= e(g0g
s
1g
m1
2 · · · g
ml−1
l , h)
t
= T2
ut
Before proving that MBBS- OSBE is oblivious, we
introduce the definition of statistic indistinguishability
proposed in [7]. Two distribution families D1(`) and
D2(`) are statistically indistinguishable, if∑
y
|Prx∈D1(`)[x = y]− Prx∈D2(`)[x = y]|
is negligible in `.
Theorem 10 MBBS-OSBE is oblivious.
Proof Suppose that two distribution families are D1(`1)
= {(r mod p, s mod p)|(r, s) ∈ {1..2`1p} × {1..2`1p}}
and D2(`1) = {(r′ mod p, s′ mod p) |(r′, s′) ∈ {1, · · · ,
2`1p}×{1, · · · , 2`1p}}. Each distribution has p2 points.
The difference of the probability on any points is at
most 1
22`1p2
. So, the total difference between the two
distribution families is at most p
2
22`1p2
= 1
22`1
, which
is negligible in `1. Due to `1 is linear in `, the total
probability difference between the two distribution is
negligible in `.
Therefore, (r̂, ŝ) sent by the two receivers R1 and R2
is indistinguishable from the view of sender S, where
(r̂, ŝ) = (r, s) or (r′, s′). S cannot distinguish R1 from
R2. MBBS-OSBE is oblivious. ut
Theorem 11 MBBS-OSBE is semantically secure against
the receiver if no probabilistic polynomial-time adver-
sary can forge a MBBS signature.
Proof MBBS-OSBE uses a semantically secure symmet-
ric encryption algorithm E(·), where H(·) is modeled
as a random oracle. MBBS-OSBE is semantically se-
cure against the receiver if there is no probabilistic
polynomial-time adversary A who can compute the se-
cret key which the sender uses to extract the encryp-
tion key with non-negligible probability. Namely, MBBS
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- OSBE is semantically secure against the receiver if
no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A can win
the following game against the challenger X with non
-negligible probability:
1. A (m1,m2,··· ,ml−1,g,g0,g1,g2,··· ,gl,h,y)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− X . X sends the
public parameters (m1,m2, · · · ,ml−1, g, g0, g1, g2,
· · · , gl, h, y) to A.
2. A r
′,s′,P0,P1−−−−−−−→ X . A sends partial signature (r′, s′)
and two messages P0 and P1 with the same length
to X .
3. A T0, T1, C←−−−−−− X . X flips an unbiased coin with {0, 1}
and obtains b ∈ {0, 1}. X chooses t R← Zp\{0, 1},
and computes T0 = e(g, h)
t, T1 = (yh
r′)t, T2 =
e(g0g
sgm12 · · · g
ml−1
l , h)
t and C = EH2(T2)(Pb). It
sends T0, T1 and C to A.
4. A b
′
−→ X . A outputs his guess b′ on b. A wins the
game, if b′ = b.
If there exists an adversary A who can break the
semantic security of MBBS-OSBE against the receiver
with advantage at least ε, we will show that there ex-
ists an algorithm B who can use A to forge a MBBS
signature with the same advantage.
1. Given (m1,m2, · · · ,ml−1, g, g0, g1, · · · , gl, h, y), the
aim of B is to compute a signature (σ∗, r′, s′) such
that e(σ∗, yhr
′
) = e(g0g
s′
1 g
m1
2 · · · g
ml−1
l , h). B sends
(m1,m2, · · · ,ml−1, g, g0, g1, g2, · · · , gl, h, y) to A.
2. A sends (r′, s′) and two messages P0 and P1 with
equal length to B.
3. B flips an unbiased coin with {0, 1}, and obtains b ∈
{0, 1}. B chooses t R← Zp\{0, 1}, and computes T0 =
e(g, h)t, T1 = (yh
r′)t, T2 = e(g0g
sgm12 · · · g
ml−1
l , h)
t
and C = EH2(T2)(Pb). It sends T0, T1 and C to A.
4. IfA can outputs his guess with the advantage |Pr[b′ =
b]− 12 | ≥ ε, he can compute a σ
∗ with the same ad-
vantage such that
e(σ∗, T1) = e(g0g
s′
1 g
m1
2 · · · g
ml−1
l , h)
t,
namely
σ∗ = (g0g
s′
1 g
m1
2 · · · g
ml−1
l )
1
x+r′ .
5. B aborts. B can use A to forge a MBBS message-
signature pair (m1,m2, · · · ,ml−1, σ∗, r′, s′) with ad-
vantage at least ε, where
e(σ∗, yhr
′
) = e((g0g
s′
1 g
m1
2 · · · g
ml−1
l )
1
x+r′ , hx+r
′
)
= e(g0g
s′
1 g
m1
2 · · · g
ml−1
l , h).
ut
Theorem 12 The credential in our MBBS-OSBE is
all-or-nothing non-transferable under the computational
Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Proof Given a credential (σ, s, r), if an adversary A can
compute T2, there will exist an algorithm B who can use
A to break the CDH assumption as follows.
A can get the ciphertext (T0, T1, C), and compute
e(σ, T1) = e((g0g
c
1g
m1
2 · · · g
ml−1
l yu)
1
x+r , hx+r)t
= e(g0g
s
1g
m1
2 · · · g
ml−1
l , h)
te(yu, h)
t
= e(g0g
s
1g
m1
2 · · · g
ml−1
l , h)
te(g, h)txu
and
T0 = e(g, h)
t
If A can compute T2 = e(g0gs1g
m1
2 · · · g
ml−1
l , h)
t, he can
computes e(g, h)txu = e(σ,T1)T2 . Namely, given e(g, h)
t
and e(g, h)xu , B can use A to compute e(g, h)txu . So, B
can use A to break the CDH assumption. ut
5 Oblivious Access Control
In this section, we propose an oblivious access con-
trol (OAC) scheme based on our MBBS-OSBE scheme
and the oblivious transfer (OT) scheme [23]. Actually,
our OAC scheme can be implemented by introducing
an OSBE scheme to an OT scheme. In our scheme,
a user needs to possess a credential from the issuer
(manager) prior to access the protected services. Then,
he can use his credential to obtain services from the
service providers obliviously without releasing his cre-
dential and the selected services to them. The service
providers only know the number of the services selected
by the user if he has possessed the required credential
from the issuer. Furthermore, the service providers do
not know whether the user has obtained a credential
from the issuer or not. Notably, zero-knowledge proof
is not required in our OAC scheme. Additionally, the
credentials of users in our scheme are all-or-nothing
non-transferable. Our OAC scheme can resist the eaves-
dropping attack, and also provide forward security.
5.1 CT-Adaptive t-out-of-n Oblivious Transfer
Chu and Tzeng [23] proposed an efficient t-out-of-n
adaptive oblivious transfer (CT-OTnk×1) scheme based
on chosen target computational Diffie-Hellman assump-
tion. The CT-OTnk×1 is as follows:
Setup. Taking as input a security parameter 1`, this al-
gorithm returns a group G with prime order p and
two hash function H1 and H2, where H1 : {0, 1}∗ →
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G, and H2 : G → {0, 1}`. Let g be a generator of
G. The sender generates his secret-public key pair
KG(1`) → (x, y), where x R← Z∗p and y = gx. Sup-
pose that the sender has nmessagesm1,m2, · · · ,mn
∈ {0, 1}`.
Commitment Phase.
1. The sender computes σi = H1(i) and Ei = mi⊕
H2(σ
x
i ), for i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
2. The sender sends E1, E2, · · · , En to the receiver.
Transfer Phase.
1. The receiver selects γl ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} and βl ∈
Z∗p, and computes σγl = H1(γl) and Zl = σγlgβl ,
where l = 1, 2, · · · , k.
2. The receiver sends Z1, Z2, · · · , Zk to the sender.
3. The sender responds with Cl = Z
x
l , for l =
1, 2, · · · , k.
4. The receiver computes Dl =
Cl
yβl
and obtains
mγl = Eγl ⊕H2(Dl).
Theorem 13 CT-OTnk×1 scheme is unconditionally re-
ceiver -secure [23].
Theorem 14 CT-OTnk×1 scheme is sender-secure un-
der the CT-CDH assumption [23].
5.2 Oblivious Access Control Scheme
Our OAC scheme consists of the following four algo-
rithms:
Setup. Taking as input a security parameter 1`, this al-
gorithm returns bilinear groups (e,G1,G2, Gτ ) with
prime order p, where e : G1×G2 → Gτ . It also gen-
erates three hash functions H1, H2 and H3, where
H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1, H2 : G1 → {0, 1}`, H3 : Gτ →
{0, 1}` which is used to extract a key for the se-
mantically secure symmetric encryption E(·). Let
g0, g1, g2, g3, g4 be the generators of G1, and h be
the generator of G2. The issuer generates his secret-
public key pair KG(1`)→ (x, y), where x R← Z∗p and
y = hx. Suppose that there are n service providers
SP1, SP2, · · · , SPn in the system. SPi generates his
secret-public key pairKG(1`)→ (xi, yi), where xi
R←
Z∗p and yi = g
xi
4 for i = 1, 2, · · · , n. The user gen-
erates his secret-public key pair KG(1`)→ (zu, yu),
where zu
R← Z∗p and yu = g
zu
2 .
Commitment. Suppose that SPi has ki service items
Si1 , Si2 , · · · , Siki , where Sij ∈ {0, 1}
` for j = 1, 2, · · · ,
ki and i = 1, 2, · · · , n. SPi computes ωij = H1(ij)
and Eij = Sij ⊕ H2(ω
xi
ij
), and publishes Eij , for
j = 1, 2, · · · , ki.
Issuing Credentials.
1. The user chooses a service provider SPi, and
sends it to the issuer.
2. The issuer chooses c, r
R← Zp (r 6= −x), and
computes σui = (g0g
c
1yug
si
3 )
1
x+r , where si ∈ Z∗p
is the identifier of SPi in the system.
The credential for the user is (σui , c, r, si), which
can be used to access the services managed by SPi.
Access service items.
1. The user chooses γl ∈ {1, 2, · · · , ki}, βl
R← Zp,
and computes ωγl = H1(γl) and Zl = ωγlg
βl
4 , for
l = 1, 2, · · · , πi, where πi is determined by SPi
and πi ≤ ki. The user sends (r, c, Zl) to SPi.
2. SPi chooses t
R← Zp, and computes Kl = Zxil ,
T1 = (yh
r)t, T2 = e(g2, h)
t, T3 = e(g0g
c
1g
si
3 , h)
t,
Cl = EH3(T3)(Kl), for l = 1, 2, · · · , πi. SPi sends
D = (T1, T2, Cl) to the user.
3. The user compute T3 =
e(σui ,T1)
T zu2
and H3(T3),
decrypts Cl, and gets Kl, for l = 1, 2, · · · , πi.
Then, the user computes Al =
Kl
y
βl
i
and Siγl =
Eiγl ⊕H2(Al), for l = 1, 2, · · · , πi.
Theorem 15 Our oblivious access control system is
sound.
Proof
e(σui , T1)
T zu2
=
e((g0g
c
1g
zu
2 g
si
3 )
1
x+r , yhr)t
e(g2, h)tzu
=
e((g0g
c
1g
zu
2 g
si
3 )
1
x+r , hx+r)t
e(g2, h)tzu
=
e(g0g
c
1g
si
3 , h)
t · e(g2, h)tzu
e(g2, h)tzu
= e(g0g
c
1g
si
3 , h)
t
= T3,
Al =
Kl
yβli
=
Zxil
yβli
=
ωxiγl g
xiβl
4
yβli
=
ωxiγl y
βl
i
yβli
= ωxiγl ,
and
Eiγl ⊕H2(Al) = Siγl ⊕H2(ω
xi
γl
)⊕H2(ωxiγl ) = Siγl .
ut
Theorem 16 Our oblivious access control system is
receiver secure.
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Proof 1. In our OAC scheme, the service provider SPi
cannot detect whether the user has a credential or
not; otherwise, there will exist an algorithm B, which
can use SPi to break the oblivion property of MBBS-
OSBE.
2. In our OAC scheme, SPi knows nothing about the
content of the service items selected by the user; oth-
erwise, there will exists an algorithm B, which can
use SPi to break the unconditional receiver-security
of CT-OTnk×1. This proof is the same as that in [23].
So, our oblivious access control system is receiver-secure.
ut
Theorem 17 Our oblivious access control system is
sender-secure under the q-SDH assumption and CT-
CDH assumption.
Proof If there exist an adversary A, who has not pos-
sessed a credential, can get πi services from SPi, there
exist an algorithm B who can use A to forge a BBS
signature and break the sender-security of CT-OTnk×1
as follows:
Given (g0, g1, g2, g3, g4, si, y, yi), A sends (r′, c′) to
SPi. SPi picks t
R← Zp\{0, 1}, computes T1 = (yhr
′
)t,
T2 = e(g2, h)
t, T3 = e(g0g
c′
1 g
si
3 , h)
t, and Cl = EH3(T3)(Kl),
for l = 1, 2, · · · , πi. SPi sends (T1, T2, Cl) to A. If A can
decrypt Cl, he can compute a σ
∗, such that e(σ∗, T1) =
e(σ∗, hx+r
′
)t = e(g0g
c′
1 g
si
3 , h)
t = T3, namely σ
∗ =
(g0g
c′
1 g
si
3 )
1
x+r′ , B aborts. B can use A to forge an MBBS
signature (σ∗, r′, c′) on message si, where e(σ
∗, yhr
′
) =
e((g0g
c′
1 g
si
3 )
1
x+r′ , hx+r
′
) = e(g0g
c′
1 g
si
3 , h).
If B dose not abort, he can obtain mγl from A, for
l = 1, 2, · · · , πi. So B can use A to break the sender-
security of CT-OTnk×1. This proof is the same as that
in [23].
So, our oblivious access control system is sender-
secure. ut
Theorem 18 Our oblivious access control system is
secure against the eavesdropping attack under the q-
strong Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Proof Suppose that an adversary A has possessed a cre-
dential (σ∗, r∗, c∗, si), where σ
∗ = (g0g
c
1g
z∗
2 g
si
3 )
1
x+r∗ . If
A can get services siγ1 , siγ2 , · · · , siγk , which the legal
user selected, we will show that there exists an algo-
rithm B who can use A to break the q-SDH assumption
and the unconditional receiver-security of CT-OTnk×1 as
follows:
A can get the ciphertext D = (T1, T2, Cl), where
T1 = (yh
r)t, T2 = e(g2, h)
t, T3 = e(g0g
c
1g
si
3 , h)
t and
Cl = EH(T3)(Kl). If A can decrypt Cl, he can compute
a σ such that e(σ, T1) = e(σ, h
x+r)t = e(g0g
c
1g
si
3 , h)
t =
T3. B aborts. B can use A to forge a signature (σ, c, r)
on si, where e(σ, yh
r) = e(g0g
c
1g
si
3 , h). This will contra-
dict MBBS signature scheme is existentially unforgeable
against the adaptively chosen message attacks under
the q-strong Diffie-Hellman assumption.
If B dose not abort, he can get siγ1 , siγ2 , · · · , siγπi
from A. So B can use A to break the the unconditional
receiver-security of CT-OTnk×1. ut
Theorem 19 Our oblivious access control system is
forward secure under computational Diffie-Hellman as-
sumption.
Proof If the adversary A who gets the user’s credential
(σui , c, r, si) can obtain the services siγ1 , siγ2 , · · · , siγπi
which the user selected before, we will show that there
exists an algorithm B who can use A to break the CDH
assumption as follows.
From Theorem 12, if A can decrypt Cl, he can break
the CDH assumption. B aborts.
If B dose not abort, he can get the services siγ1 , siγ2 ,
· · · , siγπi from A. B can use A to break the uncondi-
tional receiver-security of CT-OTnk×1. ut
6 Other Application
6.1 Attribute-Based Encryption
Proposed by Sahai and Waters [39], attribute-based en-
cryption (ABE) is a public encryption scheme, where
both the secret key and the ciphertext are labeled with
sets of descriptive attributes. A secret key can decrypt
the ciphertext if and only if there is a match between
the secret key and the attributes listed in the cipher-
text. In an access control system, a user needs to possess
a credential (signature) for each attribute of him from
the manager (issuer). These credentials are called at-
tribute certificate. So, we can use our OSBE scheme to
construct an ABE scheme as follows.
Let Esign(sk,m)(P ) denote the ciphertext of P , which
can be decrypted if and only if the user has obtained
a signature on m. Suppose that Ak1 , Ak2 , · · · , Aklk are
different attributes, where k = 1, 2, · · · , n. If the man-
ager wants to encrypts a message which can be de-
crypted if and only if the attributes of the user satisfy
the following conjunctive normal form
(A11 ∨A12 ∨ · · · ∨A1l1 )∧ · · · ∧ (An1 ∨An2 ∨ · · · ∨Anln )
The manager works as follows:
1. Generate his secret-public key pairKG(1`)→ (sk, pk),
where 1` is a security parameter.
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2. Choose K1,K2, · · · ,Kn, and computes K = K1 ⊕
K2 ⊕ · · · ⊕Kn.
3. Compute and broadcast
Esign(sk,A11 )(K1), Esign(sk,A12 )(K1), · · · ,
Esign(sk,A1l1 )(K1), · · · , Esign(sk,An1 )(Kn),
· · · , Esign(sk,Anln )(Kn).
4. Compute and broadcast C = EH(K)(P ), where H(·)
is a hash function which is used to extract a encryp-
tion key for semantically secure encryption E(·).
If a user has attributes A1i1 , A2i2 , · · · , Anin , and has
obtained attribute certificates sign(sk,A1i1 ), sign(sk,
A2i2 ), · · · , sign(sk,Anin ), where ij ∈ {1, 2, · · · , li}. He
can use his attribute certificates to decrypt the cipher-
text as follows:
1. Decrypts Esign(sk,A1i1 )(K1), Esign(sk,A2i2 )(K2), · · · ,
Esign(sk,Anin )(Kn) and obtains K1, K2 ,· · · , Kn.
2. Computes K = K1 ⊕K2 ⊕ · · · ⊕Kn.
3. Decrypts C = EH(K)(P ) and obtains P .
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we clarified the relationship between the
one-round OSBE and IBE. We proposed two novel OSBE
schemes based on BB signature and MBBS signature.
The credentials in our MBBS-OSBE scheme are all-or-
nothing non-transferable. Based on our MBBS-OSBE
scheme and an oblivious transfer scheme, we proposed
a new access control scheme called oblivious access con-
trol (OAC). In our OAC scheme, legal users can obliv-
iously obtain services from the service providers. As a
result, the user does not release anything about his cre-
dential and the selected services to the service providers;
while there are no aid of zero knowledge proof. We also
pointed out the potential applications of OSBE in ABE.
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